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As the threat of terrorism rises, nations seek solutions to secure their ports and 
lanes of commerce upon the world’s oceans and skies.  The transport industry has taken 
the lead in developing new technologies to track cargo containers and the transport 
platforms, for billions of dollars are at stake.  This thesis examines the present and future 
communication and tracking systems used by the transport industry.  Furthermore, an 
investigation into the tracking methods for high-value items such as diamonds will be 
disclosed.  By analyzing the communication and tracking systems used by the transport 
industry, elements of the Homeland Security organization can mitigate terrorism on the 
lanes of commerce and ultimately prevent weapons of mass destruction from entering the 
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A. STRATEGIC CONTEXT  
In the wake of September 11, 2001 (9-11) the internal security of the United 
States has again been thrust onto the national conscience.  Like the infamous day of 
December 7,1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 9-11 has reminded us how truly 
vulnerable the country is to the evil of the world.   
The nation’s response to prevent another attack such as Pearl Harbor was to 
develop long-range radars that would provide plenty of warning of an attack from a 
squadron of aircraft or missiles, which were headed for our shores.  In addition, the 
country developed an intelligence system that scours the world for information that 
would determine which countries were hostile to the United States (US).  These systems 
enable us to find diplomatic solutions before tensions escalate to the level that another 
country would attack and also provide us the lead time and knowledge to carry the war to 
an aggressor state’s front door. 
However, 9-11 has cast light on a new aggressor, the terrorist.  Terrorist groups 
are not nation states and do not possess the means of carrying out conventional warfare. 
They study our weaknesses within the US borders.  They look at the transportation 
industry as a vehicle for terror to deliver a crushing blow to the US economy and national 
psyche.  
September 11th proved that the country’s airline industry was susceptible to 
terrorism and measures have been taken to mitigate any weaknesses within the airline 
system.  In addition, 9-11 has brought about deep concerns for the security of the nation’s 
ports.  The most prevalent concern has been that a terrorist would attempt to smuggle a 
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) into the country through a cargo container shipped 
from overseas.  Knowing that drugs and illegal aliens are routinely smuggled into the 
country amongst other legitimate cargo on large commercial ships, this concern becomes 
very realistic and a potential nightmare for the nation. 
Furthermore the General Accounting Office reports,  
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More than 95 percent of our non-North American foreign trade arrives by 
ship.  In 2001, approximately 5400 ships carrying multinational crews and 
cargoes from around the globe made more than 60000 US port calls.  
More than 6 million containers enter the country annually [Ref 1]. 
These numbers indicate that terrorists have ample opportunity to deliver a WMD to one 
of the nation’s ports. 
If a WMD were detonated in one of the nation’s major ports, the economic effect 
would be devastating.  The nation got an early glimpse of the economic woes associated 
with the closure of a port during the labor conflict at West Coast ports in early October 
2002.  During the 10-day strife between management and dockworkers, it was estimated 
that the economy might have lost $19.4 billion.  Furthermore, not only was the US 
economy affected, but Asian manufacturers considered stopping production because their 
products were stacking up on the docks in Asian ports [Ref 2].  Thus, due to the 
interdependence of world trade, the longtime closure of American ports can have grave 
effects upon the global economy. 
Due to the potential grave economic losses, the United States government and the 
maritime industry have taken significant steps to improve security of ports and cargo 
containers.  Programs such as the Smart & Secure Tradelanes Initiatives, US Customs 
Service’s Container Security Initiative, and Operation Safe Commerce are government 
and industry partnerships aimed at enhancing cargo security and efficiency along the 
global supply chain.  The emphasis of these programs is to use or develop technologies to 
ensure that the cargo container is tamper proof and can be tracked from its place of origin 
to its final destination. 
B. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
The maritime and container industries worldwide have developed a number of 
technologies to track intermodal cargo containers from the time the container enters a 
terminal or dock to which transport platform it is loaded on and to its final destination.  
Many of the tracking technologies have been developed in North America and Europe.  
The tracking technologies being developed are broadly divided into two categories, 
satellite- based and infrastructure-based.  Satellite tracking systems use Global 
Positioning Satellites (GPS), communications satellites, Global Standard for Mobile 
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telephony (GSM) and the Internet to relay information from containers, ships, or aircraft 
to the shipper and the carrier.  Infrastructure-based systems use radio tags, tag readers, 
802.11b wireless technology, Bluetooth Lite, GSM and the Internet to relay data from a 
service provider to the shipper and the carrier.  Note that there are different combinations 
for the makeup of a satellite or infrastructure-based system, thus all elements listed above 
for the respective tracking system may not be present. 
These technologies are implemented to improve efficiency, customer service, and 
security.  The technologies allow transport companies to identify containers that are in a 
low use area and transfer them to a high use area.  Idle containers or the transport of 
empty containers cost the transport companies money.  The transport company can 
communicate directly with customers to relay the status of refrigerated or hazardous 
containers or indicate whether the shipment will be delivered on time.  Customers can be 
alerted if the containers are damaged or compromised.  The physical appearance of the 
tracking devices mounted on the containers deters unauthorized entries that result in theft, 
smuggling, and illegal immigration.  As governments recognize the security benefits of 
tracking technologies and as their cost to be implemented become less for transport 
companies, the equipment will permeate throughout the market. 
This thesis examines existing and future tracking and communication systems 
used to track cargo platforms and the cargo containers.  The methodology involves a 
survey of the existing tracking systems and those planned for the future.  In addition, the 
thesis will attempt to report on the tracking schemes used in unique/high value shipments, 
such as raw diamonds and international bank checks for clearance.  Investigating the 
tracking and communication systems used to trace cargo and transport platforms may 
give elements of Homeland Security the ability to mitigate terrorism and prevent the 
transport of WMD into the United States. 
Chapter II is a presentation of tracking systems for shipboard and airborne cargo.  
The technologies covered are satellite systems, radio identification systems, web-based 
systems, and the administrative trail created by the elements of the bill of lading and 
letter of credit.  In addition, methods of how to defeat tracking systems, e-seals, and 
RFID tags are discussed. 
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Chapter III details the tracking systems for ships and aircraft.  Satellite systems, 
radio systems, and human agent organizations are covered in this section. 
Chapter IV depicts the methods for tracking unique or high value items.  Tracking 
technologies for these items will concentrate on methods and processes used to trace 
items such as diamonds and international bank checks. 
Chapter V covers areas in which the information within this thesis can be applied 
and proposes areas in which further study should be explored. 
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II. TRACKING SYSTEMS FOR CARGO 
A. SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
Satellite tracking systems are made up of two separate satellite networks used for 
determining positions and communicating data.  Thus, the systems are respectively called 
Positioning and Communication Satellites. 
1. NAVSTAR GPS and GLONASS 
There are currently two positioning satellite systems that are operating today, the 
Navigation Signaling and Timing Global Positioning System (NAVSTAR GPS) operated 
by the United States Air Force and the Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System 
(GLONASS) operated by the Russian Space Forces.  Both of these systems have a 24- 
satellite network broken into 6 clusters (4 satellites per cluster) orbiting in a Medium 
Earth Orbit (MEO) and each transmits in the L band.  GPS transmits the Standard 
Positioning Service (SPS) signal at 1572.4 MHz and GLONASS transmits the Standard 
Precision signal (SP) at 1602 MHz.  Both of the satellite navigation systems are capable 
of transmitting signals which provide greater accuracy than SPS and SP.  However, the 
SPS and the SP signals are available to all GPS users on a continuous, worldwide basis as 
were the GPS Precise Positioning Service (PPS) and the GLONASS High Precision (HP) 
signals are limited to military use.  To calculate position, commercial GPS receivers 
capture the SPS or SP signals; the receiver multiplies the time it took for the signal to 
reach the receiver by the speed of light to determine how far the signal traveled.  This 
calculation is completed four times for each satellite in a respective cluster and through a 
process called trilateration in which the receiver uses to deduce its position [Refs 3 and 
4]. 
2. European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service  
The position determined by the receiver is usually within 20 meters of the actual 
position.  To obtain a more accurate position an individual or entity may use a receiver 
capable of receiving Differential GPS Signals (DGPS).  A DGPS signal contains the true 
position and measured position.  The difference between these two measurements is 
designated as the differential corrected distance.  This corrected distance can be stored in 
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the base station or sent to the receiver.  When the receiver obtains the SPS or SP signal 
from each of the satellites, the receiver subtracts the differential correction from the 
estimated distance to each satellite to improve position accuracy. 
DGPS can be derived by a combination of satellite and land-based systems or two 
different satellite constellations.  Currently, DGPS is derived by using land-based and 
systems.  The GPS signal is received at a land station that knows its exact location.  The 
known location is compared with the received GPS signal, the corrected distance is 
calculated and the corrected signal is forwarded from the land station to everyone within 
the land station’s region.  Nonetheless, the European Space Agency, European 
Commission, and EUROCONTROL, the European Organization for the Safety of Air 
Navigation, are developing a system called the European Geostationary Navigation 
Overlay Service (EGNOS), which is based on a separate satellite system calculating 
DGPS.  EGNOS will be fully functional by 2004. 
EGNOS is being developed to ensure better accuracy and service.  The premise of 
EGNOS is to provide uninterrupted reliable and accurate positioning data to safety 
critical applications such as aviation navigation.  The accuracy of positions will improve 
from 20 meters to 5 meters.  In addition, the signal from this system will carry the 
accuracy of the position of each GPS and GLONASS satellite, the accuracy of atomic 
clocks onboard the satellites, and information on disturbances within the ionosphere that 
might affect the accuracy of positioning measurement.  Thus, the EGNOS system 
provides not only position data, but also a sense of reliability. 
The EGNOS system is made up of three geostationary satellites and a network of 
ground stations.  The constellation will send out ranging signals worldwide like those 
transmitted by GPS and GLONASS constellations via two Inmarsat-3 satellites, one over 
the eastern part of the Atlantic, the other over the Indian Ocean, and ESA Artemis 
satellite, which is above Africa.  These birds do not have signal generators on board, thus 
the system will depend on a ground processing station to up-link the finished signal. 
Currently the EGNOS system depends on the positioning signals received from 
GPS and GLONASS satellites.  Through thirty Ranging and Integrity Monitoring 
Stations (RIMS), the measured positions of EGNOS, GPS, and GLONASS satellite are 
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processed and sent to four master control centers that determine the accuracy of GPS and 
GLONASS signals received at each station and determines position inaccuracies due to 
disturbances in the ionosphere.  After all the deviations are calculated and integrated into 
the signal, the signal is sent via secure communications to six uplink stations throughout 
Europe.  The uplink stations send the signal to EGNOS satellites, which then transmits 
the signal to users with EGNOS receivers [Ref 5]. 
3. Galileo 
In the future EGNOS will get positioning data from a European owned global 
navigation satellite system called Galileo.  Galileo will be very similar to GPS and 
GLONASS constellations.  Thus, there will be 30 satellites in a MEO, in which three are 
spares.  The first launch is scheduled for 2004 and full operational capability is scheduled 
for 2008 [Ref 6]. 
Currently, the aviation community does not sanction existing positioning satellites 
for use in aviation navigation because both GPS and GLONASS is owned and operated 
by the countries’ respective militaries.  Because the militaries have control there is no 
guarantee that the two systems will always be available to provide service.  Thus, Europe 
has set out to develop a civilian owned system.  In addition, Galileo’s technology will 
provide accuracies up to one meter and cover the latitudes up to 75 degrees North.  
Having the capability of producing one meter accuracy and assuring the service is always 
available makes the system suitable for aviation navigation, running trains, and guiding 
cars on future automated highways [Ref 7]. 
4. ORBCOMM 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, a satellite tracking system consists 
of a GPS satellite system and a communication satellite system.  For the remainder of this 
chapter the focus will be on communication satellite systems.  One of the most popular 
communication satellite systems used for tracing containers is the ORBCOMM system 
which is based in Dulles, VA. 
ORBCOMM is made up of 30 Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites and terrestrial 
gateways deployed around the world.  Using a Subscriber Communicator (SC), GPS 
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signals are read from positioning satellites and relayed along with other data such as 
temperature, pressure, tank levels, alarms and flow rate into the ORBCOMM 
communication network via its satellites.  The data are then down linked to a Gateway 
Earth Station (GES) if originated in the United States or through an international 
Gateway Control Center (GCC) if the data originated outside of the US.  The GES or 
GCC then relays the message via satellite link or dedicated terrestrial line to a Network 
Control Center (NCC).  The NCC routes the message to the final addressee via e-mail, 
dedicated telephone line or facsimile.  Depending on the type of SC and location, the unit 
may be able to talk to GSM, radio and satellite communication systems.  Because the 
system works in two directions it is possible to send data to the container via the Internet 
and ORBCOMM constellation.  Note data sent via the ORBCOMM system are not for 
large data files or real-time interactive sessions.  Figure 1 illustrates a possible 
ORBCOMM network configuration [Ref 8].  
ORBCOMM’s operations in Europe are spear headed by MCS Europe, based in 
the Netherlands.  MCS Europe is responsible for encouraging the use of ORBCOMM 
services, managing terrestrial infrastructure, and assisting Value-Added Resellers (VAR).  
There are 31 VARs listed on the ORBCOMM website that are the middlemen between 
customers and ORBCOMM.  The VARs provide industries with tailored expertise, 
solutions, and customer support to end-users.  VARs’ solutions have targeted customers 
that have reefer trailers, reefer containers, tank containers, road tanks, rail wagons, 
vessels, box containers and private cars.  See a list of value added resellers and service 
providers in Appendix B for ORBCOMM and other communication satellites.  In 
addition, Appendix A provides a listing of the characteristics for all of the 
communication satellites discussed in this thesis [Ref 8]. 
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The Argos system was established in 1978 under a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
NASA, and the French Space Agency.  Collecte, Localisation, Satellites (CLS) in 
Toulouse, France and Service Argos, Inc, a CLS subsidiary, in Largo, MD, manage the 
system.  The primary purpose of the system is to monitor and protect the environment.  
To meet this goal the system has been employed to track and monitor hazardous cargo, 
barges carrying hazardous cargo, shipping, animals and fishing vessels [Ref 9]. 
Argos is a payload flown on board the NOAA Polar Orbiting Environmental 
Satellites (POES).  There are currently two operational POES, NOAA-16, the morning 
satellite and NOAA-17, the afternoon satellite.  In the future, Argos systems will be 
flown on satellites operated by the Japanese Space Agency and European Meteorological 
Satellite organization.  The satellites fly in near-polar sun-synchronous orbit.  The orbital 
period, 102 minutes, allows each satellite to view any point on the earth at least twice per 
day. 
Customers in the hazardous shipping business mount Argos transmitters on their 
cargo units to maintain a trace of their hazardous material to ensure safe transit.  These 
transmitters are sometimes called Platform Transmitter Terminals (PTT).  PTT transmit 
to the Argos payload at 401.650 +/-4 KHz.  Information transmitted by the PTT contains 
a preliminary synchronization sequence, statement of message length (32 to 256 bits), 
transmitter’s ID number, and sensor data attached to the PTT or other message data (32 to 
256 bits) [Ref 10].  
The satellite then transmits to all three main ground stations located at Wallops 
Island, VA, Fairbanks, AL, and Lannion, France.  There are regional receiving stations 
placed throughout the world, as well.  See page 5 of Argos User’s Manual for a list of 
regional receiving stations at www.cls.fr/manuel/.  The regional ground stations can 
receive real-time data whenever a satellite is within station visibility.  The information is 
either immediately relayed or stored and then dumped once passing over a ground station.   
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The ground stations then forward the data to Global and Regional Processing Centers 
(GPC and RPC).  GPCs are located in Largo, MD and Toulouse, France.  Both 
processing stations ensure quality control, location calculation, and archiving. 
Unlike the ORBCOMM system, Argos can provide location data without GPS.  
Localization is calculated by measuring the Doppler shift from the platform 
transmissions. 
Each time the Argos instrument receives a message from a transmitter, it 
measures the frequency and time-tags the arrival.  Using this information 
the processing center computes the locus of possible positions for the 
transmitter.  The processing center calculates an initial estimate of the 
transmitter’s position from the first and last messages collected during the 
pass and the most recent calculated frequency.  The intersection of the 
cones for these two messages with the terrestrial radius + the height 
declared for the transmitter gives two possible positions.  For each 
position, least-squares analysis is used on the equations for refining the 
estimate of the transmitter’s position and transmit frequency.  The position 
with better frequency continuity is chosen [Ref 10]. 
This method provides accuracy of 300 meters.  If the customer chooses, PTT units can be 
coupled with a GPS receiver and GPS data can be relayed, as well. 
6. Inmarsat 
In  1979 International Maritime Satellite system (Inmarsat) was launched to be the 
first maritime tracking system.  In addition to providing service for ships, Inmarsat also 
provides service for the aviation community and the land mobile units.  Inmarsat service 
supports phone, fax, and data communications up to 64 kbits/s.  The service is enabled by 
four Inmarsat-3s, second generation satellites, in a geostationary orbit.  These satellites 
are backed up by a fifth Inmarsat-3 and four Inmarsat-2s that are all in geostationary 
orbit.  In 2005 Inmarsat expects to offer broadband service via Inmarsat-4 satellites.  
According to Inmarsat, these satellites will be able to deliver Internet and intranet content 
solutions, video on-demand, videoconferencing, fax, email, phone and LAN access at 
speeds up to 432kbits/s [Ref 11]. 
Depending on the customers needs they have a choice amongst a number of 
terminals, which can communicate with a satellite.  For this chapter, focus is placed on 
Inmarsat-D+ terminals.  These terminals are about the “size of a personal cd-player” and 
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are able to provide two-way data communications.  Thus, these features have enabled 
Inmarsat to enter the container tracking and monitoring market.  These terminals can be 
placed between the grooves on containers which make them unobtrusive.  Currently these 
terminals are aimed at refrigerated containers, refrigerated and high-value road trailers 
and rail wagons [Ref 12]. 
Inmarsat D+ terminals can store and display up to 40 messages of up to 128 
characters each.  Customers can receive tone, numeric and alphanumeric messages and 
clear data.  These terminals are integrated with GPS receivers, thus position data are 
provided as well [Ref 12]. 
The ground segment of the Inmarsat system consists of 40 Land Earth Stations 
(LES).  Communications from the terminals placed on containers are relayed from the 
satellites to the LESs.  The LES is an entryway into the telecommunication networks 
throughout the globe in which messages are routed to their respective customers.  LES 
provide support to service providers, which provide the direct interface with Inmarsat 
customers [Ref 11].  See Appendix B for a list of Inmarsat service providers.   
B. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID) SYSTEMS 
1. RFID Tags for Intermodal Containers 
Radio frequency identification technology has been around since World War II.  
The British made the first major use of the technology by developing the earliest version 
of an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system.  The IFF system was developed whereby 
a transponder was placed on Allied aircraft so that by giving the appropriate response to 
an interrogating signal, a friendly aircraft could automatically be distinguished from a 
foe.  Not until the 1970s and 1980s were there other applications to utilize the 
technology, which mostly included identification systems for animals.  During the 1990s 
RFID systems became apart of everyone’s life.  If you were a commuter in metropolitan 
area you may have placed a small device on your windshield called EZ Pass, E-Pass, or 
Smart Pass to get you through a tollbooth.  Or you may have walked through the security 
terminals at the exit of a store or boutique after a purchase and have the alarm trigger 
because the security tag was not removed [Ref 13]. 
12 
RFID technology is becoming more and more prevalent in many aspects of our 
daily lives and even more so in commercial and industrial arenas.  Since 9-11, RFID has 
become a hot topic for tracking cargo in container terminals and across oceans.  The 
above section discussed how satellite systems alone could track containers on ships 
across oceans.  This section will concentrate on container tracking within terminals with 
RFID technology. 
RFID technology in the container industry generally has five components: an 
active or passive tag (transponder), an antenna, a transceiver, a reader, and an information 
system to maintain and transport the data.  Tags are programmed with data that identifies 
the container to which the tag is attached.  Other information within the tag may be where 
the container originated, destination, goods within the container, and owner of the goods. 
Active tags use a battery to run the microchip circuitry and broadcast a signal to a reader.  
Passive tags are designed so that they reflect modulated RF energy back to the 
transceiver.  In addition, tags can be designed so they can be read only or read and 
overwrite stored information.  A reader retrieves and sometimes writes data to a tag.  The 
reader then relays the data to a database. 
A typical RFID setup places an active or passive tag on a container.  A reader is 
placed in a strategic point such as an entranceway.  When the tag passes the reader, 
information on the tag is transmitted to the reader.  That information along with the 
position of the reader is then transmitted to the information system, which maintains the 
information in a database.  Depending on the service provider, that information is 
accessible to the customer by the Internet with a web browser or emailed upon query or 
sent at predetermined times.  Figure 2 depicts a possible RFID setup at a container 
terminal [Ref 14].  This figure assumes that tags are already on the containers coming off 
the ship.  The readers are placed at strategic positions throughout the yard to determine 
the position of the container.  In addition, this RFID system would be complemented by 




Figure 2.   Possible RFID Setup in a Container Terminal  (After:  Ref 15) 
 
Most tags and readers communicate at frequencies ranging from 50 KHz to 2.5 
GHz.  The system described above, a typical product of Intermec, communicates at 915 
MHz and 2450 MHz [Ref 14].  0Transcore, a global leader in supply chain management, 
works with the same setup, however, most of their asset tracking solutions are applied in 
rail yards for tracking rail cars or intelligent transportation systems, electronic toll ways 
or Smart Pass, for toll collection.  Transcore does provide service for container tracking.  
The company’s products use the same frequency as Intermec [Refs 14 and 16]. 
Savi Technology, another global leader in asset management based in Sunnyvale, 
CA, offers a slightly different architecture from that mentioned above.  In addition to the 
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tag and reader architecture, Savi includes another element that they call a signpost.  This 
three-element architecture allows Savi to use multiple frequencies to communicate at 
short ranges, four meters or less, and long ranges, 100 meters.  The system works by 
placing the signpost at strategic points within a container yard.  The signpost transmits 
location data to the tag at 132KHz and the tag transmits at 433.92 MHz or 868 MHz to a 
reader, maybe at 100 meters away, the location data it received from the signpost.  From 
the reader the data are relayed to information system [Ref 17].   
One of the information system products that Savi sells to international shipping 
customers is the Asset Management System (AMS) for intermodal containers.  As 
described by Savi, “AMS is a web-based application that provides online tracking, 
security monitoring, and management of cargo containers.”  The system configuration 
consists of a MS Windows 2000, Sun Solaris 8, HP 11, or RedHat Linux 7.2 web server.  
An application server runs BEA WebLogic 6.1 SP2 and the database is run on Oracle 8I 
[Ref 18]. 
WhereNet Corp. and SkyBitz have teamed up to provide tracking not only upon 
the container’s arrival in a terminal but while in transit as well.  WhereNet uses 802.11b 
technology throughout its Constant Visibility Solution (CVS) in terminal yards.  Teaming 
with Skybitz allows WhereNet to take advantage of Skybitz’s Global Locating System 
which uses existing satellites to track assets.  Together the companies have produced 
terminals, which contain two transmitters that take advantage of both solutions.  The 
transmitter provided by Skybitz is unique because it does not calculate location from 
GPS.  Instead, the GPS position data are forwarded to a service operation center to be 
calculated.  Not having the calculations done organically increases the life of the battery 
used to power the unit [Ref 19]. 
2. E-Seals  
Electronic seals (e-seals) are intelligent cargo seals that can automatically alert 
terminal personnel or concerned customers via wireless communications in the event of 
tampering.  Alerts provide date, time, and position of the container when a seal is 
breached.  The primary purpose of e-seals is to provide physical security.  The seals may 
act as a sensor that provides an immediate alert upon a breach or behave as an indicator 
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that tells an official the seal was tampered with at a specified time.  However, they can 
also take on the secondary role of tracking if the transmitter within the seal is designed 
with satellite GPS capability.  Furthermore, e-seals have unique identification numbers 
that are recorded on the bill of lading and kept in databases.  Thus, the container can be 
indirectly tracked by tracking the e-seal used to secure the container. 
E-seals are made up of a two-element architecture, e-seal and a reader.  The e-
seals communicate with the reader via RFID, infrared, direct contact, or long range 
cellular or satellite.  This paper will focus on e-seals that communicate via RFID, cellular 
or satellite. E-seals consist of a type of housing for electronics, a cable or bolt seal, which 
fastens the container doors, identification number, and for most, a power source.  
Like the RFID tags described previously, e-seals are designed to be passive or 
active.  The range for an active seal is up to 100 meters.  E-seals operate in five frequency 
bands, which are determined by their geographical area.  The International Standard 
Organization is working with industry to determine standard frequencies.  Table 1 lists 
the frequencies used for e-seals in geographical regions around the world. 
Frequency (MHz) Geographical Area 
315 Much of Asia 
433 Europe and North America; parts of Asia 
915 North and South America 
862-928 Awaiting Global Approval 
2450 Japan 
Table 1.   Electronic Seals & RFID Frequencies (Ref 20) 
Readers are very much like the readers mentioned above when in the architectural 
environment.  For instance, the readers are placed at entrances or key zones within a 
container terminal yard.  However, some readers may be handheld which forces 
personnel to visually check the seal due to the short range.  Thus, these readers could be 
personal digital assistants or laptop computers.  In addition to the data mentioned earlier, 
seals may contain contents of the container, shipper’s contact information, other manifest 
details and destination. 
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An e-seal that lends itself to global tracking is a hybrid of an e-seal and a radio 
tag.  This combination allows the unit to communicate via satellite, GSM and the 
Internet.  All Set, a Swedish based company, manufacturers a product like this in which 
the data passed to the reader are relayed to a global server via a satellite, GSM and the 
Internet.  Communication between the tag and readers is accomplished via Bluetooth Lite 
technology, which operates at 2.45 GHz.  Bluetooth Lite is a derivative of the personal 
area wireless network protocol Bluetooth.  Bluetooth is used to connect personal digital 
assistants to cell phones, computers and other mobile devices wirelessly.  All Set says the 
difference is that Bluetooth Lite allows for even more efficient radio protocol and ultra 
low power consumption.  The readers are placed in strategic positions in ports so that 
they can report the position of the containers as they pass.  Customers’ computers are 
integrated with All Set’s server so that they may receive updates without query.  
Furthermore, All Set’s e-seals or tags can be integrated with sensors to monitor 
temperature, humidity, pressure, shocks, and lights.  More importantly, unlike other e-
seals, All Set’s unit can alert personnel if the container is being breached from the 
sidewalls by detecting a change in the container’s pressure or the introduction of light.  
The design of the seal aids in providing this capability.  Note the placement of the seal as 
illustrated in Figure 3.  Most seals are placed on the door locks of the container and alert 
personnel to when the door has been open [Refs 21 and 22].  All Set’s unique placement 
provides partial concealment of the seal and the ability to incorporate sensory information 
which overcomes some of the vulnerabilities associated with e-seals.  Further discussion 




Figure 3.   Unique Placement of All Set E-Seal (From:  Ref 21) 
 
NaviTag, a company based in North Quincy, MA, has designed e-seals that can be 
tracked via satellite, as well.  This technology allows the tracking of the container’s 
integrity while in transit.  The e-seal contains a low power, simplex (communicates one 
way) satellite modem that allows it to communicate with existing satellites.  The modem 
is integrated with door and light sensors to provide alerts of when the doors of the 
container open.  Thus, this technology is similar to All Set except the unit is placed on the 
front of the container doors where it is susceptible to manipulation or damage.  The data 
are relayed via satellite every one and half-hours to NaviTag’s Datacentre.  At the 
Datacentre the information is processed, stored, and sent to customers as required [Ref 
23]. 
C. TRACKING SYSTEMS FOR AIR CARGO  
1. Web-Based Systems 
Information Builders, a software company based in New York, NY, developed a 
software solution called WebFOCUS that is used to track Unit Load Devices (ULD) for 
the airline industry.  ULD is the name for a cargo container used in the airline industry.  
Under the management and operation of the International Airline Transport Association 
(IATA), sixty airlines funded the development of the WebFOCUS system.  Essentially, 
Information Builders took the legacy error-prone ULD Control system and upgraded it to 
a web-based system.  The web-based system works by having airlines enter ULD transfer 
information in a form at a Website maintained by IATA.  The software verifies data as it 
is entered and prompts users to be accurate in their data entry.  The data are stored in an 
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Oracle database running on a Windows server.  The information is presented in HTML, 
XML, PDF, or Excel format that can be downloaded.  This is by no means a real-time 
system; however, Information Builders foresees barcode or RFID technology being 
coupled with its WebFOCUS architecture to provide a real-time system [Ref 24]. 
2. RFID Tags on ULDs 
Envirotainer, based in Knivsat, Sweden, is the world’s largest provider of 
temperature-controlled air cargo containers.  These containers are used to ship perishable 
pharmaceuticals, meat, seafood, produce, and semiconductors.  The containers can 
maintain temperatures between 20 degrees and minus 20 degrees Celsius.  Recently, 
Envirotainer teamed up with Savi Technology to develop a real time location system for 
tracking their ULDs. 
The system is currently under development and may include a tag device that uses 
a global positioning system receiver attached to a cell phone modem.  The tag would 
transmit the location and temperature of the ULD via satellite.  The data are processed 
and stored using Savi’s Asset Management System.  In addition, the system allows 
Envirotainer to do online booking with clientele in order to track and better utilize their 
containers [Ref 25]. 
D. PAPER TRAIL 
1. Bill of Lading 
There are two important documents which are used to establish contract terms 
when moving containerized goods across international borders.  These documents are the 
bill of lading and letter of credit.  These documents can be used to determine the owner of 
the contained goods, destination of a cargo container, and what goods are in the 
container.  For this section, focus will be on the Bill of Lading (B/L).   
The B/L is a contract for transportation and receipt for cargo that a carrier gives to 
a seller when a carrier transports goods on behalf of a seller.  The B/L certifies that the 
carrier has received the goods mentioned in the B/L and it proves ownership of the goods 
declared in the B/L.   
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A B/L can be bought, sold, or traded while the goods are in transport.  In order for 
such a transaction to take place there must be a negotiable B/L or “to order” B/L.  If a 
negotiable B/L is used then the carrier will not turn over the goods to the buyer until the 
seller endorses the original bill of lading and the carrier receives it.  Getting the original 
bill of lading with seller’s endorsement keeps the carrier from being liable after releasing 
the shipment.  There is also a straight B/L or a waybill, which cannot be bartered.  Upon 
arrival at the destination the carrier will turn over the goods to the buyer when the buyer 
presents identification  [Ref 26]. 
Information that should be included in a B/L is as follows: the name and address 
of the carrier (transport company); the shipper (the seller, sender, or his agent); the 
consignee (the buyer or his agent); the name and nationality of the ship; the port of 
departure and port of destination; description of goods; instructions of freight; place and 





Figure 4.   Bill of Lading (From:  Ref 27) 
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2. Letter of Credit 
A letter of credit is a document that guarantees financial terms between a seller 
and buyer.  On behalf of the buyer a bank will issue a letter of credit to pay a seller upon 
presentation of specified documents representing the goods in question.  The letter of 
credit may stipulate the required documents to be the bill of lading, invoice, insurance or 
a combination thereof.  In addition, the letter of credit will denote a time expiration 
clause.  Thus, the seller is given so many days to acquire the documentation needed to 
deliver to the bank for which payment will be surrendered before the letter of credit 
expires.  There can be more than one bank involved in this process especially in the realm 
of international trade.  Typically, the buyer will obtain the letter of credit from a bank in 
which he or she is already a customer.  The buyer’s bank is called the advising bank 
which arranges transactions with the seller’s bank, the issuing bank.  The following 
details how a letter of credit is obtained: 
- The buyer and seller agree to the terms and conditions of the transaction, 
including means of transport, period of credit offered, latest date of 
shipment and relevant international set of trade terms (Incoterm) to be 
used.  These terms identify the exact responsibilities and liabilities of both 
the buyer and seller while the merchandise is in transit. 
- The buyer submits a request to the bank for the letter of credit 
- The bank evaluates the buyer’s credit rating, and may require a cash 
cover and/or reduction of other lending limits. 
- The buyer’s bank issues the letter of credit and notifies the advising bank 
(seller’s bank) by airmail, teleprinter exchange (telex), Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) or 
Financial Information Network (FIN). 
- The advising bank establishes the authenticity of the letter of credit using 
signature books or test codes, then informs seller (beneficiary) and 
confirms the letter of credit. 
- The letter of credit becomes the legal agreement between the issuing 
bank and the designated beneficiary (seller). 
- The seller confirms that the letter of credit matches the commercial 
agreement, and that the terms and conditions can be satisfied in the 
allotted time period.  If there is anything that may cause a problem, an 
amendment should be requested. 
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- The seller ships the goods and gathers all the documents requested in the 
letter of credit, such as the invoice, transport document, bill of lading, 
insurance, etc. 
- The documents are presented to a bank, often the advising bank.  The 
advising bank checks the documents against the letter of credit. 
- If the documents comply with requirements, the bank pays the seller and 
forwards the documents to the issuing bank. 
- The issuing bank also checks the documents.  If they are in order, the 
issuing bank will reimburse the seller’s bank immediately. 
- The issuing bank debits the buyer and releases the documents (including 
transport document), so that the buyer can claim the goods from the carrier  
[Ref 28]. 
Figure 5 is an example of a letter of credit. 
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E. DEFEATING TRACKING SYSTEMS AND E-SEALS 
1. GPS 
At the heart of the tracking system lays the positional data provided by GPS.  
Without GPS the tracking system cannot perform its function.  GPS has been found to be 
very susceptible to jamming and spoofing.  Spoofing is the ability of intercepting data 
and sending false data to a recipient to produce misleading information.  The John A. 
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center published a report stating, “A 1 Watt 
GPS-Like signal can prevent C/A code acquisition to more than 620 miles” [Ref 30]. 
C/A, course acquisition code, is the signal used by the civilian sector. 
A spoofing experiment run by John S. Warner and Roger G. Johnston at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory demonstrated how easy it would be to spoof the GPS signal.  
By using a modified GPS simulator, breaking the original signal to the GPS receiver with 
a GPS jammer, and inserting the GPS signal from the simulator, the scientists were able 
to submit false data to the receiver, which would be passed on to an unsuspecting service 
provider or customer.  The benefit of spoofing the GPS signal makes it easy for criminal 
or terrorist organizations to “highjack” a container, truck, or railcar without bringing any 
attention to the new course in which the vessel or container would be directed by its new 
owner. 
During the experiment, the scientists used two stationary trucks with one mounted 
with a GPS receiver and the other acting as the attacker with the GPS simulator.  After 
the original GPS signal from the satellites was broken, a signal from the GPS simulator 
was introduced to the receiver.  The scientists noted that the spoofing signal could be 
maintained up to 30 feet from the receiver, however, initial introduction of the simulated 
signal had to be done within close range for 15 seconds to 3 minutes.  After establishing 
contact with the receiver the attacker could then move out to a maximum distance of 30 
feet. 
The GPS receivers attacked during the experiment were the handheld receivers 
Delorme Earthmate and Magellan Meridian.  These receivers may or may not contain the 
same circuitry as the receivers used on cargo containers.  Also, the scientists noted that 
obtaining a GPS simulator was relatively easy.  The units could be bought or rented at 
reasonable prices.  In addition, the units could be homemade using data from the Internet. 
25 
Lastly, the scientists believe that GPS spoofing could be countered by improving 
the accuracy of the clocks within the GPS receivers.  The scientists suggest improved 
accuracy would not allow the clock error and drift to be exploited.  Furthermore, the 
scientists believe that if a timestamp was added to the transmission of the signal from the 
GPS receiver that spoofing could be detected. 
To obtain a copy of this report entitled, “A Simple Demonstration that Global 
Positioning System (GPS) is Vulnerable to Spoofing”, the interested reader may contact 
Dr. Warner via email at jwarner@lanl.gov [Ref 31]. 
2. Circumventing or Defeating E-Seals or Tracking Tags 
Los Alamos National Labs Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) has declared, 
“All of these seals, at least in the way they are conventionally used, can be defeated 
quickly using only low-tech methods, tools, and supplies available to almost anyone at 
low cost” [Ref 32].  This national lab has tested “tamper-indicating seals” for the last 12 
years.  This section of the paper will discuss the methods which may be used to 
circumvent or defeat the security of an e-seal. 
One of the problems that may exist for containers equipped with e-seals or tags 
placed on container ships is the placement of the container itself on the ship.  Containers 
can be buried deep beneath the upper decks of a container ship.  The burying of the 
container may mean that the signal from the e-seal or tag is buried and unable to 
communicate with a satellite.  This may be overcome by developing an antenna system to 
be coupled with the ship’s existing communication system so that the e-seal or tag signal 
can be routed above decks and transmitted to the satellite. 
A more intentional method of circumventing the function of an e-seal is to cut a 
hole in the container or remove the doors of the container from the hinges without 
disturbing the seal.  Since most e-seals focus on deterring an individual from opening the 
doors by sounding an alarm if tampered with, the thief might find a way to go around the 
e-seals.  Most e-seals are not capable of detecting other points of entry into a container 
other than the door entrance. 
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Furthermore, if a thief does not care about his or her intrusion being detected after 
the fact, the thief may defeat the seal by destroying it or using electronic jamming to 
eliminate the alarm and/or keeping the seal to prevent an investigation from determining 
when the break-in occurred.  E-seals are often designed to indicate when and where they 
were tampered with especially if they do not possess an alarm mechanism.  Also, the 
perpetrator may remove a tag and place it on another container depending on how secure 
the tag is to the original host [Ref 31]. 
The VAT indicates education of e-seal use and vulnerabilities associated with 
particular e-seals and tags is badly needed.  Normally e-seal installers and inspectors are 
not well trained on the vulnerabilities of e-seals and tags.  In addition, vendors and 
manufacturers make unreasonable claims about the products they provide.  The lack of 
education and overstatement of product capability aid sophisticated criminal and terrorist 
organizations in exploiting the e-seal and tracking tags [Ref 31]. 
3. Automated Information Systems 
All of the information provided by a tracking system is usually delivered from the 
provider via the Internet to the customer.  Since the provider is connected to the Internet 
the data provided are susceptible to all of the computer and network security 
vulnerabilities associated with the Internet.  If a provider does not have information 
assurance for the company’s network then the provider may be providing false data 
injected by hackers working on behalf of a criminal or terrorist organization.  Even 
though a company has an outstanding information assurance program, if the program is 
not extended to the customer an attacker could spoof the customer.  Although the 
company is sending good data the customer is getting altered data from an attacker, 
which is intercepting the good data and resending bad without the company or customer 
knowing. 
F. SUMMARY 
Orbcomm, Argos, and Inmarsat satellite communication systems have been 
evolving their services over the years and may find that demand for their tracking 
services will increase as prices drop and the shipping and manufacturing industries try to 
secure the global supply chain from manufacturer to retail.  RFID and e-seal technology 
will play a significant role in local tracking within a terminal yard and provide security 
throughout the cargo containers transit.  All of these technologies together, along with the 
paper work exchanged to establish payment and a description of the goods being shipped 
create an environment that can be examined by organizations of Homeland Security for 
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wrong doing or possible intelligence gathering.  In addition, one should not be pulled in 
by a false sense of security because there are vulnerabilities which limit the tracking and 
security functions provided by GPS, e-seals, and RFID tags. 
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III. TRACKING SYSTEMS FOR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT 
A. SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
1. Inmarsat 
Inmarsat’s satellite capabilities were developed for ship management and distress 
and safety applications.  To provide these services Inmarsat has produced the Inmarsat-C 
terminal, a two-way data communications device, which is used on road vehicles, trains, 
fishing and merchant vessels and in aviation platforms.  Once the Inmarsat-C is 
operational it transmits to the satellites at frequencies between 1626.5-1645.5 MHz and 
receives between 1530-1545 MHz. 
Messages can be sent either to or from the terminal.  Messages can be no bigger 
than 32 kbytes.  Messages are packetized upon transmission and reassembled at the Land 
Earth Station, where they are sent to the customer via the respective countries 
telecommunication system, telex, Internet, or telephone.  Furthermore, Inmarsat-C 
possesses the capability to be polled.  Polling allows the customer base station to query 
the Inmarsat-C terminal which causes information to be automatically transmitted back to 
the customer.  For instance, if a shipping company wanted to know where its vessel was 
the company would send a signal from its base station to interrogate the Inmarsat-C 
terminal for position data. 
The Inmarsat-C terminal can be incorporated with the vessel’s existing navigation 
systems, such as GPS or Loran-C receivers, to provide position reporting.  In addition, 
the terminal is integrated with the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
(GMDSS).  With the touch of a button on a Digital Selective Calling (DSC) radio, a 
distress signal containing the name of the ship, the position, and nature of the distress is 
sent to other ships, shore stations, and rescue organizations every four and a half minutes.  
The signal travels via satellite, Inmarsat, VHF radio channel 70, HF and MF radio 
terminals.  The International Maritime Organization requires ships over 300 gross tons to 
install Inmarsat-C terminals with the GMDSS [Ref 32]. 
GMDSS is composed of the Digital Selective Calling (DSC) radio, Navigational 
Telex (Navtex) weather and navigation information dissemination system, and Inmarsat.  
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See Section D of this chapter for detail on DSC.  Navtex is a digital broadcast of weather 
forecasts, severe weather warnings, and navigational hazards.  The broadcast is 
transmitted at 424 and 518 KHz by coastal stations [Ref 33].  
Also, Inmarsat-C terminals are capable of sending and receiving e-mail.  This 
capability largely depends on whether the service provider offers the service.  Inmarsat-C 
terminals are assigned with a nine-digit identifier called the terminal ID or Inmarsat 
Mobile Number (IMN).  The IMN allows the terminal to a have a “virtual email address” 
when coupled with the domain name of the service provider.  The format would be 
IMN@domain name.  Example of a domain name would be Comsat.com, thus, 
123456789@Comsat.com would be the e-mail address for an Inmarsat-C terminal.  The 
vessel’s email address and destination address are put in the body of the message.  The 
addresses are later extracted from the body and forwarded to the recipient via the 
Internet.  Because data are transmitted over the satellites Inmarsat charges a fee which is 
paid via the vessel or terrestrial sender.  The charges only apply when data are sent over 
the satellites.  Service providers that provide e-mail via Inmarsat-C are Comsat, EIK 
Global Communications, France Telecom, Station 12, Stratos, T-Mobil, Telstra, and 
Telia Mobile [Ref 33]. 
2. Iridium 
Iridium, an Arlington, VA, based company, is composed of 66 low-earth orbiting 
satellites which provide coverage over the entire world with the exceptions of Hungary, 
Poland, N. Korea, and N. Sri Lanka.  Iridium phone calls are not allowed to connect over 
these countries’ local telephone systems.  The satellites have the capability to cross-link 
or relay information amongst them.  Crossing-linking also means that the satellite which 
received the initial data does not need a gateway to be in the satellite’s footprint which 
contributes to fewer outages and relies less on landline networks.  Satellite-to-satellite 
communications are transmitted at 23.18 – 23.38 GHz [Ref 34]. 
Services provided by Iridium include data, short burst data, short message service, 
voice and paging.  Iridium provides services to the marine industry through a two way 
voice and data terminal called SkyConnect Marine.  Service partner SkyConnect LLC 
from Takoma Park, MD, markets the unit and the unit is produced by Icarus Instruments, 
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a Herndon, VA, based company.  The terminal can be a dedicated handset for use on the 
bridge or multiple phones can share the dial tone.  In addition, computers can be 
connected to the terminal to access the Internet and send email.   
SkyConnect Marine provides communication services only; however, NAL 
Research Corporation based in Manassas, VA, provides a product called the 9522 L-Band 
Transceiver with GPS.  This unit provides position, velocity, and time in addition to the 
other services previously mentioned.  The terminals transmit and receive communications 
at 1616 – 1626.5 MHz [Ref 35]. 
Iridium’s service partners also provide communication devices for aircraft.  Icarus 
Instruments also produces the SkyConnect Executive cordless handset.  This device is a 
satellite phone, which can be used in the cabin of a turbine or turbo-prop aircraft.  The 
unit is not compatible with GPS because GPS has not been approved for air navigation  
purposes.  This holds true for other Iridium compatible aircraft communication devices 
produced by Iridium service partners Honeywell, Intcomqrp, and BlueSkyNetwork [Ref 
35]. 
3. Eutelsat 
Eutelsat is a Paris, France, based company, providing service fleet management 
and communication services for the maritime community.  The solutions for these 
services are titled EutelTRACS and Emsat. 
Emsat is predominantly a communication suite for vessels to communicate at sea.  
The system provides mobile telephony and data services, SMS and positioning data.  The 
system is composed of a small central unit with fax, computer, and sensor ports.  There is 
a mobile handset with screen and an antenna.  A GPS card is integrated into the system to 
provide positioning data. Emsat transmissions are relayed via an Inmarsat satellite located 
at 25.15 degrees East.  The gateway for this system is located in Lario, Italy, and 
managed by Telespazio.  Through this gateway customer’s information is routed to 
Public Switched Telephone Network.  See Appendix A for communication frequencies 
associated with Inmarsat satellites, and see Appendix B for a list of Eutelsat service 
providers that offer Emsat or similar solutions. 
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EutelTRACS is a joint project between EutelSat and Qualcomm Incorporated to 
bring efficient fleet management solution to maritime industry.  EutelTRACS is 
supported by two Eutelsat satellites.  These satellites are called SESAT and W3, which 
are located at 36 degrees East and 7 degrees West.  Coverage is provided over Europe, 
the Atlantic Islands, North Africa, Middle East and Central Asia, and steerable coverage 
exists over the Aegean region and India.  The gateway for this system is located near 
Paris.  The uplink and downlink for the terminals are described in Appendix A. 
The EutelTRACS terminal consists of a keyboard, liquid crystal display and base 
station.  The unit can be connected to temperature sensors, leak and impact detectors via 
a RS232 interface connection.  Thus, this system could be used for monitoring cargo 
containers as well.  Software used to manage the link between the customer’s information 
system and EutelTRACS Network Management Center is called QTRACS.  This 
software manages the dispatching, messaging, positioning and mapping capabilities.  The 
software can be run on personal computers, IBM AS/400 and System/36 midrange 
systems, mainframes, and UNIX systems [Ref 36]. 
4. Globalstar 
Globalstar, a San Jose, CA, based company, provides 48 LEO satellites covering 
the earth from 70 degrees North to 70 degrees South for satellite phone communications.  
The ground segment of the system is made up of gateways, a Ground Operations Control 
Center (GOCC), Satellite Operations Control Center (SOCC), and Globalstar Data 
Network (GDN).   
Through the gateways, transmissions are sent from satellites to the customer.  The 
gateways are connected to local PSTN or public land mobile networks (PLMN) via T1 
lines.  Gateways are owned and managed by Globalstar service providers and are 
responsible for servicing their countries and other nations depending on the geographical 
location.  The GOCC plans and controls the gateway terminals use of the satellites and 
coordinates with the SOCC.  The SOCC tracks satellites, controls their orbits, and 
provides telemetry and command services.  The GDN provides the connectivity amongst 
all of the elements previously mentioned [Refs 37 and 38]. 
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The company’s original mandate is to provide handheld satellite phone service 
around the world.  However, in recent years the company started to provide Internet and 
private data network connectivity, position location, SMS, and call forwarding. 
Globalstar does not advertise any of its services as being vessel-monitoring solutions or 
asset management tracking services; however, they do provide the solutions needed for 
aircraft and commercial and cargo ships to communicate position and other data while 
deployed. 
Communication devices made for ships and aircraft uplink to the satellites at 1610 
– 1625.5 MHz and downlinks at 2483.5 – 2500 MHz.  The coverage only extends a little 
beyond 200 miles from the coastal areas around the world.  This means that entire oceans 
are not covered, causing dropped calls in those areas.  Figure 6 depicts the coverage 
provided by Globalstar.  Within Figure 6 note that the orange color denotes the primary 
service area, the yellow color indicates extended service area low signal strength and the 
purple color represents areas with intermittent signal strength [Ref 34]. 
Although, Globalstar does not offer complete global coverage, the system assures 
connectivity in the primary service areas through a process called “path diversity”.  This 
process enables two or more satellites that cast a footprint on the user to capture and 
transmit the call simultaneously.  If a user moves out of the satellite footprint, the call is 
able to continue through another satellite without loss or disruption of the call [Ref 39]. 
 
Figure 6.   Globalstar Coverage (From:  Ref 39) 
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Position location is provided by the Globalstar constellation rather via the GPS 
satellite system.  The satellites calculate position using radio frequency (RF) time 
difference of arrival (TDOA), frequency difference of arrival, angle of arrival or a 
combination of the geolocation methodologies.  Accuracy of the positions is up to 10 km. 
Incidentally, this type of positional technology is similar to Radio Determination 
Satellite Service (RDSS) created by GEOSTAR in the 1980s and currently owned by 
Comtech Mobile Data Corporation (CMDC).  RDSS establishes geolocation by radio 
frequency TDOA using two or more satellites in geosynchronous orbit.  CMDC currently 
uses GPS along with the two-way communication capability of RDSS to provide location 
data in its movement tracking system service, which is enabled by Inmarsat constellation.  
Although GPS technology seems to be the favorite for geolocation, RDSS is worth 
investigating.  Major Darius M. White, class of 2002 from the Naval Postgraduate School 
conducted thesis research on RDSS systems; thus, exploring his thesis would be an 
excellent way to find a complete discussion on RDSS and the geolocation methodologies 
mentioned previously [Ref 40]. 
Unlike others in the satellite service industry, Globalstar offers encryption to 
secure the customers communications.  The encryption algorithm used is either Harris 
Citadel CCX or Triple Data Encryption Standard (DES).  The encryption key is 128 bits 
in length.  There are three unit models produced by Qualcomm, Rainbow Mykotronix, 
and Copytele Inc.  See www.globalstar.com/view_page.jsp?page=encryption for more 
information about the encryption units produced by the previously mentioned 
manufacturers [Ref 41]. 
5. Thuraya 
Commercial service for the Thuraya system commenced during July 2001.  
Thuraya Satellite Telecommunications Company, based in United Arab Emirates, owns 
the system.  The system is made up of three geostationary satellites located at 44 degrees 
East, 28.5 deg East, and 87 degrees East.  These locations allow coverage for Western 
Europe, Northern Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and India.  Figure 7 provides an 
illustration of the Thuraya coverage map. 
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Figure 7.   Thuraya Coverage Map (From:  Ref 42) 
 
Whether or not Thuraya offers location system solutions for cargo containers, 
ships, or aircraft is unclear since its primary purpose is to offer satellite phone capability 
throughout the coverage area.  However, Thuraya’s handsets contain satellite, GSM, and 
GPS technology.  Thus, this system could provide customers with tracking capability but 
without the automation provided by other systems mentioned earlier.  This is definitely a 
system that could cater to private individuals, small businesses, and criminal or terrorist 
syndicates.  These phones transmit and receive at 1626.5 –1660.5 MHz and 1525 – 1559 
MHz, respectively.  The headsets are dual mode, thus they can switch from GSM to the 
Thuraya Satellite network when out of range of GSM cell towers [Refs 34 and 43]. 
6. New ICO 
New ICO is a London, UK, based company that offers global coverage for 
messaging, data transfer, telephone and Internet connectivity via handheld devices.  To 
launch this service the company will operate 10 satellites with 2 spares at MEO with 
inclinations at 45 and 135 degrees.  There will be 5 active satellites per orbital plane.  The 
ground segment of the system will consist of 12 earth stations or Satellite Access Nodes 
(SAN) located throughout the world.  Using the company’s high-bandwidth global 
Internet Protocol network called ICONET the satellites will be able to communicate with 
the SAN [Ref 44]. 
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Like the Thuraya system, the handsets will be dual mode capable.  The handsets 
will automatically switch from GSM network to the New ICO network depending on the 
signal strength with a GSM tower or users can manually switch between networks.  The 
handsets will uplink at 2165 – 2200 MHz and downlink at 1990 – 2025 MHz.  
Furthermore, the National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative (NRTC) reports that 
New ICO proposed to the Federal Communication Commission to authorize the use of 
satellite frequencies on the ground for all Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) providers.  By 
transmitting satellite frequencies on the ground amongst a MSS provider’s earth stations, 
the user would not have to be in view of the satellite to connect to the MSS providers 
network.  Whether the FCC has ruled on this proposal is uncertain [Ref 45]. 
7. Ellipso 
Satellites communication providers will continue to grow in numbers and expand 
their services.  New systems such as Ellipso, a Washington DC based company, which 
comes online in the next couple of years will expand their services from personal 
communications to asset management tracking to expand their market audience and 
profitability. 
Ellipso’s handsets and terminals are unique in the fact that they are capable of 
providing global positioning data and look very similar to mobile cell phones carried 
today.  In addition, the handsets can act as modems for accessing the Internet.  The 
phones are dual mode, which allows them to access cellular phone networks and the 
Ellipso network.  Ellipso’s terminals will operate using second generation (2G) and third 
generation (3G) technologies.  The 2G terminals will transmit at 2165-2200 MHz and 
receive at 1990-2025 MHz.  The 3G terminals will transmit at 1610-1621.5 MHz and 
receive at 2483.5-2500 MHz. 
The difference between 2G and 3G technologies in the Ellipso network lies in the 
bandwidth.  The 3G technology uses wideband Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)  
and 2G is straight CDMA.  Wideband indicates that the frequency band is four times 
larger than the 2 GHz band used in 2G.  This wider frequency band will allow more users 
to carry on simultaneous conversations. 
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Ellipso’s satellite constellation will consist of four orbital planes covering the 
world from 50 degrees South and upward.  There will be two elliptical orbits consisting 
of 5 birds each inclined at 116 degrees.  The apogees are 7605 km and perigees are 633 
km and the orbital period is 3 hours.  There will be two circular orbits at 8050 km 
consisting of four and three birds inclined at 50 degrees South and 50 degrees North. 
The Ellipso system will start with 12 gateways and be connected to the local 
telecommunication networks using an Internet protocol to talk on wireless or wireline 
networks.  The gateways are also designed to be the workhorses of the system leaving the 
satellites to relay data only.  The gateways will conduct hand-offs, signal modulation, 
multiplexing and satellite tracking [Ref 46]. 
B. HUMAN AGENTS 
Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit (LMIU) a London, UK, based company has 
established a network of human agents throughout 2000 ports around the world to 
provide information on the movement of vessels.  The network is comprised of 400 
principal agents and supported by what the company calls subagents.  The agents gather 
their intelligence from Port Authorities, coast guards, pilots, customs, insurers, news 
agencies, and other trusted sources. 
Information provided by the agents includes owner, change of owner, flag 
changes, operator, casualty reports, types of communications systems aboard the vessel, 
Inmarsat communication identification number, origin and destination of the vessel, 
characteristics of vessels such as engine type, fuel type, position and size of cargo hold, 
type of lifting equipment on board and more.  A complete list of items gathered by LMIU 
agents can be found at www.lloydsmiu.com. 
All the data are put into a database.  LMIU boasts that the company has 
movement and ownership data since 1976 and casualty data available since 1990.  LMIU 
allows customers to access the data via the Internet, CD-rom, or hard copy.  For instance, 
LMIU’s Vessel Tracker service provides arrived and sailed dates, expected sailing date, 
next port of call, and estimated time of arrival.  For more money the service will provide 
name, flag and ownership changes.  This service is fed directly by the agent network.  
This service may be provided to the customer via email or LMIU website [Ref 47]. 
C. AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (AIS) 
AIS is not a global tracking system, but serves more as a control and local 
tracking technology for ships approaching port.  AIS is a broadcast communication 
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system mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for the safety of 
mariners.  The purpose of the system is to provide collision avoidance while underway, 
notice of arrival to ports, and traffic management coming into ports.  By using VHF 
transmitters, two VHF Time Division Multiple Access receivers, one VHF Digital 
Selective Calling (DSC) receiver, GPS and DGPS receivers and a link to shipboard 
display and sensor systems information such as the ship position, course and speed, rate 
of turn, angle of heel, pitch and roll, Maritime Mobile Service Identifier (MMSI), IMO 
number, radio call sign, name of ship, dimensions of ship, draught of ship and more are 
passed to other AIS equipped ships or shore stations.  Using this information ships and 
shore stations can immediately identify an approaching ship and provide short messages 
containing warnings or navigational hazards via email or radio [Ref 48]. 
AIS will be fitted to all ships as mandated by IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee 
in Chapter V, Regulation 19.2.4 which applies to all ships of 300 gross tons and upwards 
engaged on international waters voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross tons and upwards 
engaged on international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size.  Further details 
on this regulation concerning the dates in which the rules will apply to other vessels can 
be found at www.navcen.uscg.gov/enav/ais/AIS_carriage_reqmts.htm [Ref 48]. 
In addition, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) orders AIS on all 
commercial vessels of at least 65 feet in length, certain passenger vessels (as determined 
by the Secretary), and towing vessels over 8 meters and 600 hp; on all navigable waters 
of the United States. The MTSA also grants the Secretary authority to expand carriage to 
any other vessel it deems necessary for safe navigation, to issue exemptions or waivers 
should it find that AIS or other navigation requirements are not necessary for the safe 
navigation of a vessel or on a waterway, and, directs the Secretary to prescribe 
regulations implementing these provisions.  Secretary refers to the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security in which the Coast Guard operates [Ref 48]. 
There are five AIS types; however, Class A and Class B models are only relevant 
for this discussion since the interest is in tracking ships.  Class A is for the vessels 
mention above in IMO regulation.  Class B is for vessels that do not meet the 
requirements for Class A.  Class B systems do not transmit vessel’s IMO number or call 
sign, estimated time of arrival or destination, rate of turn, static draught and navigational 
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status.  Other AIS systems are located on search and rescue aircraft, shore stations 
providing location of navigational aids and shore stations providing text messages. 
The system transmits in the VHF band thus range of the signal is nominally good 
out to 20 nautical miles.  Frequencies used by the system are 161.975 and 162.025 MHz.  
If repeaters are used the signal can be extended farther.  Also, there is movement afoot to 
have the signal relayed over Inmarsat satellites since ships of 300 gross tons and above 
are required to be fitted with Inmarsat-C for GMDSS, which was mentioned earlier in 
this document [Ref 48]. 
D. DIGITAL SELECTIVE SERVICE (DSC) 
DSC is used with both AIS and GMDSS.  DSC is digital technology incorporated 
in the latest VHF, MF, and HF marine radios.  Using what some mariners call the 
“mayday button”, a preformatted distress message is transmitted in digital form.  The 
message will contain the MMSI and geolocation if integrated with GPS.  DSC also 
allows a vessel to selectively call a specific vessel without other vessels or stations in the 
area receiving the message.  Thus, the call-up of a vessel on channel 16 and switching to 
a more private channel is not needed.  DSC is set to channel 70 on VHF radios [Ref 49]. 
E. SUMMARY 
All of the satellite systems mentioned above are communication systems that 
offer geolocation service; however, they target different audiences for their products.  In 
general, Inmarsat, Iridium, Eutelsat, and Globalstar provide service for shipboard and 
aviation use.  Thuraya, New ICO, and Ellipso provide personal communication for those 
in areas where conventional phone service is not available.  In addition, the personal 
phones provided for each of these systems could be used on established cellular networks 
due to the dual modality designed into the handsets. 
Because these units do offer global communication for personal use, terrorist and 
criminal organizations are probably taking full advantage of this capability to manage 
their enterprises.  Elements of Homeland Security should explore these systems to gleam 
any information that may provide indications and warnings of terrorist and criminal 
activity.  In addition, if AIS is transmitted over Inmarsat, this information and that data 
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IV. METHODS FOR TRACKING UNIQUE ITEMS 
A. DIAMONDS 
1. Illicit Trade of Diamonds 
Diamonds are a form of currency that can be moved in a moment’s notice and 
with little trouble.  Imagine carrying ten million dollars in your pocket without any 
suspicion.  Due to their ease of movement, they are very attractive to criminal and 
terrorist organizations.  They are used to pay debts, pay bribes, and buy arms due to the 
ease of their liquidation.  To thwart the illicit trade of diamonds often called “Blood 
Diamonds” or “Conflict Diamonds” the international community has sought a process, 
which depends on a chain of certificates to accompany the shipment of raw diamonds.  
The world will depend on these chains of certificates called the Kimberly process to 
enforce accountability and deterrence in the illegal trade of diamonds. 
Before discussing the Kimberly process, take a look at the world diamond mining 
industry in Figure 8.  Most of the world’s diamond deposits are in Africa, Australia, 
Canada, and Russia.  Major diamond trade takes place in Antwerp, Tel Aviv, New York 
and Mumbai.  The hot spot for diamonds is in the African region due to civil wars taking 
place in countries such as Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the 




Figure 8.   Snap Shot of the World Diamond Industry (From:  Ref 50) 
In addition, terrorists are able to cash in on the instability of the regions because 
their movements go largely unnoticed, and they are able to launder money via buying 
diamonds.  Monrovia, Liberia, has reportedly become the place to launder money using 
diamonds.  To make the transaction, one would find a willing Monrovian diamond 
salesman, offer to buy the diamonds a little over market value to make the transaction 
appealing to the salesman, travel to either Switzerland, the United States, or Antwerp, 
Belgium and sell the diamonds below market value to redeem the cash quickly [Ref 50]. 
2. Tracing Rough Diamonds 
In illicit transactions such as this, rough diamonds are probably bartered.  Rough 
diamonds are virtually untraceable.  However, the BBC reported early this year that 
Belgian scientists have devised a way of determining the origin of individual diamonds.  
Scientists have developed a technique, which can provide a chemical fingerprint of a 
diamond that will reveal where the diamond was mined.  The technique consists of 
drilling a microscopic hole into a diamond and extracting a sample.  Using chemical 
analysis techniques the sample is compared to other samples to determine where the 
diamond originated.  The technique is still being perfected and scientists will have to 
gather chemical composition fingerprints from diamond mines around the world to have a 
basis to compare rough diamonds [Ref 51]. 
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3. Tracing Polished Diamonds 
Polished diamonds that are made ready for retail sale are often engraved with a 
serial number using a laser or an ionic beam.  The serial number is usually placed along 
the girdle of the diamond.  These high-tech engravings make polished diamonds easier to 
track.  Figure 9 reveals Canadian diamond companies fingerprinting techniques to allow 
their diamonds to be tracked. 
            
Figure 9.   Diamond Fingerprinting (From:  Refs 52 and 53) 
 
4. Kimberly Process 
The Kimberly Process also ensures that polished diamonds do not come from 
conflict diamonds due to the controlled process in which rough diamonds are handled.  
The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was born May 2000 in Kimberly, 
South Africa in response to the threat of conflict diamonds illicit trade undermining the 
legitimate diamond market.  The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 
urged the international community to provide a solution to curb the trade of conflict 
diamonds and KPCS was the answer from over 50 nations, which attended the 
conference. 
KPCS requires that a nation involved in the trade of rough diamonds provide a 
certificate to accompany the shipment of the rough diamonds and the container to be 
sealed.  The certificate will travel with the diamonds all the way to the retail buyer.  In 
addition, a confirmation receipt is sent to the originating exporting authority.  The  
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country from whose territory a shipment of rough diamonds is leaving and possesses the 
authority to validate the Kimberly Process Certificate designates the exporting authority 
[Ref 54]. 
Nations participating in the KPCS are responsible for developing their 
certificates; however, they must contain specific elements to meet the minimum 
requirements set by the Kimberly Process.  Those standards are as follows:  
- Each Certificate should bear the title “Kimberley Process Certificate” and the 
following statement:   
- “The rough diamonds in this shipment have been handled in accordance with the 
provisions of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for rough diamonds”.  
- Certificates may be issued in any language, provided that an English translation 
is incorporated;  
- Unique numbering with the Alpha 2 country code, according to ISO 3166-1 
- Tamper and forgery resistant 
- Date of issuance 
- Date of expiry 
- Issuing authority  
- Identification of exporter and importer 
- Carat weight/mass; Value in US$  
- Number of parcels in shipment 
- Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System 
- Validation of Certificate by the Exporting Authority 
Optional Elements 
- A Certificate may include the following optional features:  
- Characteristics of a Certificate (for example as to form, additional data or 
security elements);  
- Quality characteristics of the rough diamonds in the shipment;  
- A recommended import confirmation part should have the following elements:  
- Country of destination;  
- Identification of importer;  
- Carat/weight and value in US$;  
- Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System;  
- Date of receipt by importing Authority;  
- Authentication by Importing Authority [Ref 55]. 
Although the KPCS has the best intentions, it will only be as good as the 






B. INTERNATIONAL BANK CHECKS 
There is no standard process in which foreign checks are handled by financial 
institutions.  The following is an email from a colleague describing how his institution 
handled foreign transactions.  Mr. Turner worked in the banking industry for nine years 
and held the position for Regional Vice President before embarking on a new career. 
Back when I used to negotiate checks drawn on foreign banks the 
procedure would be to provide our client a voucher for acceptance of the 
check drawn on the foreign bank.  Then we would prepare an international 
draft requesting that the check be converted to one drawn on a US dollar 
account with a bank that uses the US Federal Reserve as a clearinghouse.  
We would then wait on a physical check to credit our client's account.  In 
some cases the foreign bank would wire transfer the funds to our client's 
account.  This scenario was especially true for banks in developing or 
third world countries, or those with unstable governments.  Another 
scenario is that the check you were presented is actually drawn on a US 
dollar account with an American bank that the foreign bank uses for its 
dollar accounts.  In this case your bank would simply take the check as 
deposit and credit your account as it would with any other check drawn on 
a US bank [Ref 56]. 
This process may be entirely different at other institutions, but they may use 
common conduits to communicate the transaction of a foreign check.  Some of the 
communication systems used by banks are Telex and SWIFTnet. 
1. Telex 
Telex stands for teleprinter exchange.  From the 1920’s until the 1980’s, a 
network of mechanical and electronic teleprinters and telephone switching centers made 
up the Telex system.  The system operates with the international telegraph alphabet Nr. 2 
and at a throughput speed of 50 baud.  Telex allows real-time two-way text 
communication between two users.  Terminals used by each user display what is being 
written by the sender and receiver.  Industries that use the system are largely the financial 
and shipping sectors.  In the shipping industry Inmarsat-B terminals deliver Telex from 




These industries use Telex because the system provides delivery receipt of a 
message and requires authentication between sender and recipient.  Due to this capability, 
Telex was granted global document legal status.  Documents sent via telex are considered 
legally binding.  Major banks do not use the Telex system anymore, but the system is still 
used in developing countries [Refs 57 and 58]. 
Today, instead of using outdated teleprinter terminals Telex is accessed with 
Personal Computers (PC) running Telex software or through an internet/Telex gateway.  
Using Telex software such as TMData Services’ PCTelex on an IBM compatible PC 
equipped with a Hayes modem, a user can dial into the TM Telex Network through a 
PSTN.  The software emulates the functionality of a Telex terminal to be able to send and 
receive telex messages [Ref 58]. 
Telex accessed via an internet/Telex gateway may or may not require the addition 
of software.  A company called Plain Sailing based in the UK offers Telex services using 
existing email.  Email is prepared as usual; however, the recipient’s address is unique.  
For instance, TX_51290899@telexbynet.co.uk indicates that there is a telex message 
being sent (TX), to UK (country code is 51) and Telex number is 290899.  The message 
is then delivered via the Internet to the TelexByNet router, passed to the Telex gateway 
where the message is entered on the Telex system and reports from the Telex gateway are 
sent to the Telex delivery reporting system, and reports are sent to the originator.  Reports 
contain delivery confirmation, acknowledgement from the recipient that the message was 
received; duration of the transaction, and date and time Telex was received [Ref 59]. 
This method is not real-time; however, Plain Sailing does offer real-time service 
through a package called RealTelex.  This package requires software that emulates a 
Telex terminal.  Connecting through the Internet to the RealTelex router, messages are 
sent to the Telex gateway and directly to the recipient’s Telex machine.  The RealTelex 
software provides the functionality of Plain Sailing’s Telex delivery reporting system.  
The software will log incoming and outgoing messages, as well [Ref 59]. 
Until 1973 banks, communicated with Telex.  Since this time, Telex was 
automated by the banking industry through an industry-owned cooperative called the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT).  Today SWIFT 
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is composed of 7500 financial institutions from 199 countries that provides the 
communication network for secure transactions between the institutions.  In 1977, the 
company introduced the Financial Information Network (FIN).  FIN is a store and 
forward financial messaging service that runs on the X.25 protocol.   
X.25 is a packet switching protocol designed for sending data over a wide area 
network.  The protocol allows users to establish virtual paths between them.  A subscriber 
of the network will call another subscriber.   As the call is placed, switches and circuits 
are established to create the dedicated path.  X.25 does not have Internet Protocol  (IP) 
addressing.  X.25 addresses are noted as called address and calling address.  The source 
of the call must provide its address and the address of the subscriber being called to 
establish a virtual calling session [Ref 60]. 
2. SWIFTnet 
In addition, X.25 provides error detection and correction due to slow throughput 
speeds.  Coupled with encryption X.25 provided a suitable communication solution for 
banks considering the importance of their communication transactions.  Although FIN is 
still being used today, the system is being replaced with SWIFTnet FIN.  SWIFTnet FIN 
provides secure real-time and store-and-forward messaging file transfer and browsing 
capability.  SWIFTnet FIN runs on the IP protocol and encrypts traffic with Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) technology and uses secure IP protocol between networks.  Secure IP 
commonly called IPsec uses router gateways to provide an encrypted Virtual Private 
Network (VPN).  SWIFT is the certificate authority, registration authority, and certificate 
directory for its PKI.  Using proprietary software, SWIFTnet Link and SWIFTAlliance 
interface products, SWIFT projects to have its members connected to SWIFTnet by the 
end of 2004 [Ref 61]. 
C. SUMMARY 
SWIFTnet handles large transactions such as foreign exchange payments, 
securities transaction and other large transactions between financial institutions.  Thus, 
due to the continuing use of Telex in Third World countries and the ability of Inmarsat-B 
terminals to communicate Telex messages from sea to shore, the Telex system may be  
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used in communication efforts by terrorist or their financial transaction may be sent via 
Telex since this system is sometimes the premiere communication standard in a 
developing nation. 
Furthermore, if the Belgian scientists are able to perfect a technique that can 
match a diamond to its origin this may give the Kimberly Process real influence in 
curtailing illegal diamond trading.  Customs agents or other authorities would be able to 
determine if the Kimberly Certificate was valid by comparing the scientific origins of the 
diamonds to those origins alleged on the certificate.  This type of validation process 





1. Maritime Tracking System 
There have been discussions in the US government for creating a maritime 
tracking system for ships, which approach the coastal waters of the United States.  The 
Chief of Naval Operations has exclaimed, 
In conducting homeland defense, forward deployed naval forces will 
network with other assets of the Navy and the Coast Guard, as well as the 
intelligence agencies to identify, track and intercept threats long before 
they threaten this nation. 
I said it before and I’ll say it again today, I’m convinced we need a 
NORAD for maritime forces.  The effect of these operations will extend 
the security of the United States far seaward, taking advantage of the time 
and space purchased by forward deployed assets to protect the U. S. from 
impending threats [Ref 62]. 
This thesis contributes to a possible national maritime tracking effort by providing 
information on tracking systems used by commercial sectors to track ships and aircraft 
that could be monitored by Homeland Security and Defense organizations for terrorist 
activity. 
As described in Chapter III, the Automated Identification System (AIS) could be 
transmitted via Inmarsat satellites.  Instead of having the AIS signal transmitted 96 hours 
before reaching US coastal waters, transmissions could be sent via Inmarsat and relayed 
to maritime watch centers around the world whenever vessels set sail.  Foreign and US 
Coast Guards would be able to track vessels from port-to-port around the globe and share 
their data on suspicious ships.  The Maritime Security Act supports this general concept.   
However, Maritime Information Service of North America (MISNA) proposes to 
take advantage of the GMDSS and Inmarsat combination as opposed to AIS because 
GMDSS is a more established system.  GMDSS is currently used for emergency 
situations, but MISNA recommends having authorized shore stations polling the system 
for positional data and having that information relayed to a central watch floor [Refs 62 
and 63].  Even though each system currently provides a unique service both can be 
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adapted to broadcast geolocational data of ships around the world over a satellite 
network.  Monitoring such a network will help to mitigate terrorist activity upon the lanes 
of commerce. 
2. Telex Coverage 
In addition, this thesis raises the concern that terrorists may be using the Telex 
system to communicate within their organizations due to the geographical locations in 
which they operate.  Terrorists are often operating in developing countries or third world 
countries to keep a low profile.  These countries may not have established cellular 
networks or access to the Internet.  However, a Telex system may be operational.  In 
addition to possible terrorists’ communiqués passing over these networks, terrorist 
financial transactions may be passing over the Telex system.  Telex was originally 
developed to support banking transactions, and some poor countries may still be using 
this system in their financial institutions.  If the Telex system is not being monitored 
Homeland Security and Defense Organizations should investigate these systems. 
3. Pushing E-Seals and RFID Development 
Lastly, this thesis points out the weaknesses associated with e-seals and RFID tag 
systems.  Knowing these weaknesses will give policy makers within the Homeland 
Security Organization the ability to continue a push for the development of better e-seals 
and RFID tags.  In addition, education on the installation and inspection of these systems 
may be brought to the forefront to enhance security not only from the product end but 
from the user end, as well. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Relatively New Satellite Systems 
There are a number of new satellite systems that have recently come online or will 
be coming online in the near future.  Globalstar, New ICO, and Ellipso systems meet the 
description of being new or relatively new, thus they require a more in-depth 
investigation, which may lead to better collection efforts against these communication 
systems.  In addition, there needs to be a continuing lookout for existing satellite systems 
that may initiate the offering of location services in their solution or product line.  
Furthermore, satellite systems that provide digital television broadcasting should be 
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explored for tracking capability.  In a report written November 2002 by EyeForTransport 
called “Cargo Security Overview”, the organization lists the use of digital television 
frequencies as an emerging technology for tracking mobile assets.  Currently open 
sources do not provide any insight into this technology, but it may be on the horizon [Ref 
64]. 
2. More Spoofing Required 
The GPS spoofing experiment conducted by Los Almos National Lab was an eye 
opener to the vulnerability of the GPS system.  Similar experiments aimed at actual GPS 
receivers used in tags and e-seals presented in this paper and those in the near future 
should be conducted to provide an even more realistic environment.  Further exploration 
should include the possibility of targeting GPS receivers on ships and planes.  Targeting 
GPS for ships and planes may stimulate debate for adding protections to the civilian GPS 
signal.  If success is found in spoofing or jamming the GPS receivers on ships and 
aircraft, one must also study the protective measures being taken by the Europeans to 
prevent spoofing and jamming against the Galileo project.  The Galileo project is being 
built for the sole purpose of assuring continuous civilian use and for aviation navigation.  
For instance, if foreign aircraft entering European airspace are to use Galileo for air 
navigation, what protective measures are the Europeans taking so that the signal cannot 
be compromised which may cause an aviation accident? 
3. Combination of Satellite and RFID Tracking System 
In the near future there may be the possibility of marrying RFID technology with 
satellite communication technology.  This paper has already mentioned the relationship 
that exists between 802.11b, Bluetooth Lite, GSM and satellite technology, which is used 
to track containers.  However, no company has presented a solution that uses RFID and 
satellite technology to provide full-time tracking of a cargo unit.  Generally, RFID 
technology stops when the container unit is loaded on a vessel and picks up again when 
the unit gets to its destination.  Thus, there is no tracking provided while the container is 
in transit except for maybe the tracking of the vessel. 
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, CA, proposes the development of 
a system that would use an infrared transceiver for local communication and a microwave 
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transceiver for communication over longer distances.  To accomplish this proposal, a tag 
or transponder would work in unison with what the lab calls a retainer unit.  The tag 
would have the basic functions of being able to store data, providing self-power and 
incorporating GPS.  The tag would then be placed into the retainer.  Through the retainer, 
communication could be done via a satellite, microwave repeaters, infrared, and possibly 
with RFID.  This design allows for more information to be loaded on a tag and 
communicated in local and transient environments [Ref 65]. 
The problem with developing such a device as proposed by NASA or other 
systems like it is maintaining a power source and keeping the cost of the unit down.  
After manufacturers are able to manage the power issue more systems will be developed 
which are similar in concept proposed by NASA.  Thus, the market needs to be 
monitored for these new developments. 
C. SUMMARY OF WORK 
The goal of this project was to explore the different tracking technologies used to 
trace cargo containers, ships, and aircraft.  In addition, an investigation of tracking unique 
items such as diamonds and foreign bank checks was conducted to gain some insight on 
how the diamond and financial industries could be examined to mitigate criminal and 
terrorist exploitation in these areas.  This study also alerts organizations in Homeland 
Security and Homeland Defense of new communication signals that will be associated 
with commercial shipping, which can be scrutinized for evidence of terrorist activity.  
Lastly, the vulnerabilities associated with the deployment of GPS, e-seals and tags 
were reiterated from the findings conducted by the VAT at Los Alamos National 
Laboratories.  Although e-seals and tags are developed with the intentions of improving 
security, improper use may be undermining their effectiveness.  In addition, authorities 
should always be mindful that malicious computer attacks could be performed to spoof 
the contents of a cargo unit.  In other words, what a user sees on the screen may be what 
the company intended to ship, but what was actually shipped in the designated cargo 
container was something entirely different.  The stroke of a few computer keys can 
subvert state-of-the-art tracking technology unless a strong information assurance plan is 
implemented and executed in concert with the tracking systems. 
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APPENDIX A. SATELLITE CHARACTERISTICS 
Description ORBCOMM ARGO INMARSAT GLOBALSTAR IRIDIUM EUTELSAT
Orbit Type LEO
Polar Sun Synch, 
Circular GEO LEO LEO GEO
Orbit Height (Km) 900 850 36000 1400 900 36000
Number of Satellites 30 4 to 6 6 to 20 48 (8 spares) 66 3
Frequency Uplink (MHz) G-S 148 - 149.9 PTT - S 401.65 T-S 1626.5 - 1646.5 G-S 5091 - 5250 G-S 29.1 - 29.3 GHz 13 - 14.5 GHz
Frequency Downlink (MHz)
G-S 137 - 138, 400.05 - 
400.15 unknown S-T 1530 - 1545 S-G 6875 - 7055 S-G 19.4 - 19.6 GHz 10.95 - 12.75 GHz
MAC Method X.400 unknown FDMA CDMA FDMA/TDMA
Service Data, GPS and messaging Data, GPS Voice, data, fax, telex Voice, data, fax Voice, Data, FAX, GPS Voice, fax, data, sms, GPS
Coverage Global Global Global Global Global
W & E Europe, 
Mediterranean, Middle 
East, and Atlantic Oean
Inclination (degrees) 45 and 135 98.7 0 - 4.2 52 86.4 13.5
Website orbcomm.com argosinc.com inmarsat.com globalstar.com iridium.com eutelsat.com
Description NEW ICO THURAYA ELLIPSO EGNOS Galileo
Orbit Type MEO GEO Cir Equatorial & Elliptical GEO MEO
Orbit Height (Km) 10000 36000
C - 8050, Ellipt A-7605, P-
633 36000 10000
Number of Satellites 10 3 17 3 30
Frequency Uplink (MHz) S-H 2165-2200 G-S 6425 - 6725 G-S 15400 - 15700 1.6 GHz C and L band 
Frequency Downlink (MHz) H-S 1990-2025 S-G 3400 - 3625 S-G 6775 - 7075 14 GHz uknown
MAC Method TDMA FDMA W-CDMA CDMA CDMA
Service Voice, data,fax, GPS Voice, data, fax, GPS Voice, data, GPS, Internet GPS GPS
Coverage Global
Western Europe, N. 
Africa, Middle East, 
Central Asia, & India 55 degrees South and up Europe Global
Inclination (degrees) 45 6 0 and 116 0 56
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APPENDIX B. VENDOR LIST 
Satellite Resellers and Service Providers 
1.  ORBCOMM RESELLERS 
Hansestar 








1031 Bay Blvd. Suite F 
ChulaVista, CA, 91911 
USA 




Ing. Norberto Pesce, Director 5501 Godoy Cruz Avda. San Martin Sur 36 
Mdza 
Argentina 




Kathleen Wallace,  
201-3590 Airport Road  
Penticton, British Columbia, V2A 7J6 
Canada 




Guglielmo Mazzacano, Via Tiburtina, 965  
Rome, 00156 
Italy 







VEERS Elektronik + Meerestechnik GmbH & Co. KG 
Stephan Wenzke,Flugplatz Holtenau Sued Eekbrook 15Kiel,  
Germany, D-24159Europe 




Brian J Wilson, COO 
404-12 High Street E Moose  
Jaw, Saskatchewan, S6H OB9 
Canada 
Phone:  (306) 693-3442 
 
VascoTrack Ltd. 
Phil Vella, General Manager 
No. 2 Royal Mews Gadbrook Park 
Northwich, Cheshire, CW9 7UD 
UK 
Phone: +(44) (0) 1606-812-600 
www.vascotrack.com 
 
2.  INMARSAT SUPPLIERS 
 
Arcom Telecom Services & Applications 
40 Agiou Konstantinou, Aethrio Centre 
Maroussi  
151 24 Athens 
Greece 











203 Swan Road   
Middlesex TW136LL 
United Kingdom 














2 Brewer Hunt Way 
Kanata, ON K2K 2B5 
Canada 
Phone:  1-866-499-6199 
www.vistardata.com 
 
3.  EUTELSAT SERVICE PROVIDERS 
 
Markland Group, Inc 
108, Ivan Javakhishvili St 
Tbilisi 380064  
Georgia 
Phone:  +995 77 41 07 50 
 
France Telecom Mobile Satellite Communications 
16 Boulevard du Mont d’Est 
93192 Noisy-le-Grand Cedex 
France 
Phone:  +33 1 48 15 73 54 
 
Telespazio 
Via Tiburtina 965 
00156 Rome 
Italy 
Phone:  +39 06 4079 3778 
 
CTC 
31-33, Smolenska St. 
Kiev 01680 
Ukranine 
Phone:  +380 44 490 8128 
 
Applied Satellite Technology 
Burlingham House 
Hewett Road 
Gapton Hall Estate 
Great Yarmouth 
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Norfolk NR31 ONN 
United Kingdom 
Phone:  +44 1245 275 581 
 
SATKO 
Buyukere Cad. No:  121 
Ercan Han II-Blok 
Kat:  4-80300 Gayrettepe 
Istanbul  
Turkey 
Phone:  +90 212 212 8200 
 
4.  IRIDIUM SATELLITE SERVICE PARTNERS 
 
Electronic & Electrical Maintenance Co 
Shuwaikh-Industrial Area 
Area 1, Street 12 
Block 99 
Kuwait 
Phone:  +965 482 0113 
www.eemchkuwait.com 
 
East Satcom Telecommunications 
United Emirates 
Phone:  +97114 2211211 
 




Phone:  +32 3 210 15 10 
www.edchq.com 
 
Global Plus Limited 
Allied Building 
Francis Rachel Street 
P.O. Box 195 
Mahe 
Seychelles 









P.O. Box 153 
Caboolture Qld 4510 
Australia 
Phone:  (71) 22432 Telcsc AA 
www.xantic.net 
 
Jembas Assistencia Tecnica Lda 
Rua Rainha Ginga 190 
Luanda 
Angola 
Phone:  +244 2 320629 
www.jembas.com 
 
Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. 
Mobile Satellite Business 
15 Hill Street #02-00 
Telephone House 1 
Singapore 179352 
Phone  +65 64169333 
www.singtel.com 
 
5.  GLOBALSTAR REGIONAL PROVIDERS 
 
Saudi Globalstar Operations 
P.O. Box 25916  
Riyadh 11476 
Saudi Arabia 
Phone:  966 1 474-8848 
 
Globalstar North Africa 
4. Av d’Essaouira Rabat 1000 
Tunisia 
Phone:  037 76 79 37/09 
www.globalstarna.ma 
 
Mibo Trading d.o.o 
Azize Sacirbegovic 9 
Sarajevo-Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Phone:  +387 33 201333 
 
Globalstar Egypt 
1 Hassan Allam Street, Heliopolis 
Cairo 11341 
Egypt 
Phone:  +20 2 41878678 
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Apex Communications –Vancouver 
Globalstar  
1-525 Seymour St. 
Vancouver, British Columbia V6B 3H7 
Canada 




Av. Principal de la Castellama con 
Av. San Felipe, Torre Centro Letonia, 
PB Local G1. Caracas.  Venezuela 
Phone:  +58 2121 286 9060 
 
GloCall Satellite Telephones BV 
Jacques Perkstraat 3A 
2274 GP Voorburg 
P.O. Box 95555, The Netherlands 
Phone:  +31 (0)70-3001818 
 




203 Swan Road   
Middlesex TW136LL 
United Kingdom 
Phone:  +44 (0) 20 8744 8500 
 
Algerie Telecom Mobile 
Centre de Gestion et de  
Facturation Thuraya 
07 Chemin du Paradou Chalet N  




Alkan Communication  
Thuraya Satellite Services 
8 El Gazaaer St. 
New Maadi 11435 
Cairo, Egypt 






The Telecommunication Company of Iran  
TCI Building  
Dr. Shariati Ave  
Tehran, Iran  
Phone:  +98 21 8780500 
 
Danisat Ltd. 
P.O. Box 472 
50 Town Range 
Gibraltar 
Phone:  +45 73 425601 
 
Partners Company Ltd. 
P O Box 4668 
Sana'aYemen 
Phone: +967 1 420499 
 
FARHAN COMMERCIAL COMPANY. LTD  
P.O. Box 5887 
Riyadh 11432, Saudi Arabia 
Phone: +966 1 2192000 
 
Syrian Telecommunications  
Establishment 
Austrad Al Mazza  
P.O. Box 11774 
Damascus Syria 
Phone: +963 11 612 2226 
 
Tunisie Telecom 
Rue Asdrubal- 1002 
Tunis 
Tunisia 














E-seals and RFID Providers 
All Set 
Gustavslundsvagen 147, Box 14112 
S-167 14 Bromma, Sweden 
Phone:  +46 (8) 801588 
www.allset.se 
 
Intermec Corporate Headquarters 
6001 36th Avenue West 
Everett, WA 98203-9280 




221 West Squantum St. 
North Quincy, MA 02171 




615 Tasman Drive 
Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707 
www.savi.com 
 
Transcore Marketing Communications 
19111 Dallas Parkway, Suite 300 
Dallas, Texas 75287-3106 




16 Hacharoshet St 
Or-Yehuda 60375, Israel 
Phone:  972-3-5339359 
www.higtek.com 
 
E.J. Brooks Company 
World Headquarters 
8 Microlab Rd 




2858 De La Cruz Blvd. 
Santa Clara, CA 95050 
www.wherenet.com 
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